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Abstract
The breadth of human generosity is unparalleled in the natural world, and much research has explored the mechanisms
underlying and motivating human prosocial behavior. Recent work has focused on the spread of prosocial behavior within
groups through paying-it-forward, a case of human prosociality in which a recipient of generosity pays a good deed forward
to a third individual, rather than back to the original source of generosity. While research shows that human adults do
indeed pay forward generosity, little is known about the origins of this behavior. Here, we show that both capuchin
monkeys (Cebus apella) and 4-year-old children pay forward positive and negative outcomes in an identical testing
paradigm. These results suggest that a cognitively simple mechanism present early in phylogeny and ontogeny leads to
paying forward positive, as well as negative, outcomes.
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Introduction
Humans frequently and willingly engage in costly behaviors that
benefit others, even when their actions are anonymous and when
those helped are total strangers [1,2]. This proclivity for prosocial
behavior is unparalleled in the natural world and is thus thought to
play a key role in large-scale cooperation unique to human society
[3]. As a result, much research has been devoted to understanding
the social, cognitive, and biological processes that encourage (and
discourage) prosociality in adult humans [4–7]. Recently,
researchers have begun to explore the spread of prosocial behavior
within populations [8,9]; specifically, several studies have exam-
ined when and why people pay forward prosocial behavior
[10,11]. This concept of ‘‘paying-it-forward’’ is simple: Person A
helps Person B and Person B, rather than paying this kindness back
to Person A, pays it forward to Person C, thus facilitating the spread
of prosocial behavior beyond the dyad to a larger group of
individuals. While experimental research [9,12,13] and real-life
accounts [14] indicate that humans do pay forward positive
outcomes, the psychological underpinnings of such behavior
remain unresolved. Traditional explanations for paying forward
positive outcomes tend to rely on socially and cognitively complex
mechanisms including gratitude [15–18], cultural and moral
norms [19,20], and processes requiring sophisticated perspective-
taking abilities [21]. Taken together, these social and cognitive
constraints might suggest that paying forward generosity is a
uniquely human phenomenon.
However, a comprehensive review of the existing literature
suggests that the tendency to pay-it-forward may instead be
explained by more rudimentary behavioral strategies that are not,
in fact, unique to human adults. Specifically, it is possible that
people act on the basis of the maxim: ‘‘help anyone, if helped by
someone’’ (hereafter, help-if-helped) [22]. Unlike more cognitively
complex explanations for the propagation of prosocial behavior,
this strategy does not require memory of the identities of
interaction partners [23], sensitivity to one’s own reputational
status [24,25], the capacity to calculate the potential costs and
benefits of prosocial behavior [26], or the use of self-control to
inhibit initial selfish urges [27,28]; instead, the strategy simply
requires that individuals do to others what was done to them. Both
mathematical models [29,30] and laboratory simulations
[12,13,31] have demonstrated that a simple rule like help-if-
helped could lead to self-sustaining pay-it-forward systems.
Moreover, experiments indicating that rats (Rattus norvegicus) pay
forward helping behaviors [32] provide further evidence that
complex and/or uniquely human social and cognitive capacities
are not required for organisms to pay forward generosity. Indeed,
these findings show that a help-if-helped strategy is not only
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sufficient to support the propagation of prosocial behavior within
populations, but also that it likely predates more discriminating
forms of cooperative behavior that rely upon the complex social
and cognitive abilities found only in human adults.
Furthermore, the majority of existing studies investigating the
psychology of paying-it-forward focus exclusively on the prosocial
side of paying behavior forward–that is, on paying forward positive
outcomes. However, laboratory simulations of pay-it-forward
behavior suggest that negative outcomes are just as likely to be
paid forward in public goods games as positive ones [9], and
experimental evidence suggests that–in some situations–adults pay
forward greed more than generosity [10]. These findings, along
with a long history of literature on displaced aggression [33], call
into question the proposed role of prosocial intentions, positive
emotions and moral norms in paying forward like outcomes.
Instead, they suggest the existence of a strategy even more simple
than help-if-helped: they suggest that pay-it-forward behavior may
be based on the rudimentary rule of ‘‘give what you get’’
(hereafter, give-what-you-get).
Taken as a whole, this set of findings hints that existing
research–which typically divides paying-it-forward into separate
positive and negative phenomena–may be neglecting a more
parsimonious explanation for the propagation of behavior in
general. While some accounts of paying it forward favor
cognitively and morally rich accounts of human kindness
[34,35], empirical evidence suggests that these behaviors may
instead be rooted in a general tendency to reciprocate both
positive and negative behaviors in kind [9]. If this simple
explanation holds true, we would expect to see behaviors
consistent with a give-what-you-get mechanism present early in
human development, and possibly even in non-human primates.
The current study tests this possibility by examining pay-it-
forward tendencies in 4-year-old children and capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella). While there is evidence that capuchin monkeys [36–
38] and young children [39–42] consistently take advantage of no-
cost opportunities to act prosocially toward conspecifics, both
groups lack certain capacities key to current explanations of
paying-it-forward in human adults. Specifically, capuchin monkeys
largely fail at tasks that rely on perspective-taking abilities [43–47],
self-awareness [48,49], and the ability to evaluate and reflect upon
their own knowledge states [50,51] – all cognitive capacities
assumed necessary for the experience of gratitude [52–54] and
implicated in current explanations for paying forward generosity.
Similarly, before the age of five, children have difficulty in
evaluating the perspectives and knowledge states of others in a
consistent manner [55–58] and in evaluating and reflecting upon
their own thoughts and knowledge states [59]. Unlike capuchin
monkeys, however, young children have likely been exposed to
social and moral norms advocating paying forward generosity in
some form or another. Testing these populations using an identical
paradigm allows us to identify the minimal cognitive abilities
required to pay-it-forward and illuminates the role uniquely
human social and moral norms play in the propagation of paying
forward generosity.
Participants in the current study took part in a chain of non-
anonymous donation games in which individuals first received a
positive or negative outcome from a member of their social group,
and then had the chance to distribute a positive or negative
outcome to a different member of this social group. We used only
‘‘no-cost’’ options, in which participants making donation
decisions received the same outcome regardless of the outcome
they chose to deliver to a group member. The use of a ‘‘no-cost,’’
(or non-zero-sum) paradigm reduces the role of self-interested
motivations, accounts for between-species differences in self-
control and/or reputational concerns, and minimizes cognitive
demands imposed by trade-off related calculations. Controlling for
these factors allowed us to explore the minimal social and
cognitive factors underlying pay-it-forward strategies, thus making
it possible to identify the most parsimonious explanation for the
donation behaviors observed in monkeys and children.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was carried out in strict accordance with the
recommendations in the Guide for Care and Use of Laboratory
Animals of the National Institutes of Health. The protocol for non-
human primates was approved by the Institutional Animal Care
and Use Committee at Yale University (Protocol Number:#2008-
10678). The treatment of human participants in studies described
in this paper was in accordance with the ethical standards of the
American Psychological Association. Participants’ parents provid-
ed written informed consent and all procedures were approved by
the Human Research Protection Program at Yale University.
Participants
Monkey participants were 4 brown capuchins (Cebus apella)
ranging in age from 5–15 years at the conclusion of the study (1
male [NN], 3 females [HG, HR, JM]; Mage=134.86 months;
SD= 55.05). Our capuchin participants were members of the
Yale Comparative Cognition Laboratory colony where they
were socially housed in a large indoor enclosure equipped with
natural branches and toys. Capuchins were fed monkey chow
prior to testing and had access to water ad libitum. All
participants had previous experience with reward distribution
tasks involving conspecifics [36] and were familiar with one
another prior to testing. To control for the effects of previous
experience and developmental differences in social cognitive
abilities, only mature adult monkeys who had previously
demonstrated an understanding of the apparatus (Unpublished
data) were involved in the current study. Although these strict
selection criteria limited the number of monkeys we were able
to include in the study, our final sample size is nonetheless
comparable to those in other studies of social cognition in
brown capuchin monkeys [38,60–62].
We also tested 31 four-year-old children (10 males, 21 females;
Mage=54.68 months; SD= 3.45) recruited from preschools in the
greater New England area. Participants were tested in mixed
gender groups comprised of children from the same classroom; as
a result, all children were familiar with one another prior to
testing. Care was taken to ensure that children never received
from, or gave to, members of their own family. Group size was
constrained by the number of consenting participants per class,
with groups ranging in size from 3–7 individuals.
General Methods
Testing was performed using identical novel apparatuses for
the monkeys (Figure 1) and the children (Figure 2) that allowed
participants to choose between two distinct distributions. Each
distribution provided an allocation for an Actor (the participant
manipulating the apparatus), and an allocation for a Recipient
(a second participant who merely received whatever he/she was
given). The apparatus was situated between the Actor and the
Recipient such that the two participants were able to see one
another and the distribution options over the top of the
apparatus. In order to equate the non-verbal methods as closely
as possible across the two populations, children were asked not
to speak to one another or signal their preferences in any way.
Give What You Get
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The Actor was always the participant seated on the side of the
apparatus with two identical levers. By pulling the lever on her
left, the Actor could distribute the leftmost allocations to herself
and the Recipient; by pulling the lever on her right, the Actor
could distribute the rightmost allocations to herself and the
Recipient. Allocations were simultaneously delivered via a chute
to both participants immediately following the Actor’s choice,
and the two remaining allocations were removed from the
apparatus by the experimenter.
Using this apparatus, monkeys and children participated in a
series of overlapping donation games, such that each participant in
a chain first received from, and then gave to different conspecific
members of their social groups. Test sessions began when an initial
Actor distributed an outcome to a conspecific Recipient. After
both participants had collected their respective allocations, the
Recipient moved to the opposite side of the apparatus to assume
the role of Actor and the previous Actor left the testing area. At
this point, a third conspecific–ignorant to the outcome of the
previous interaction–entered the testing area to assume the role of
Recipient, and the new Actor was asked to choose between the
same distribution options presented to the previous Actor. This
process continued until all participants had received from, and
subsequently given to, a conspecific group member, with the initial
Actor serving as the recipient for the final participant. Data from
the initial Actor was excluded from analysis. Efforts were made to
ensure that testing and data collection procedures were identical
between species whenever possible (however, see Methods S1,
Table S1, and Table S2 for between-species methodological
differences).
Allocations were placed inside of clear, round, plastic
containers that allowed for easy distribution via the apparatus.
The placement of the distribution options (positive/negative)
into the apparatus was counterbalanced to control for the
possible role of side biases in participant’s donation choices (see
Methods S1, Table S1, and Table S2 for more details). For
each test trial, Actors had the option to deliver one of two
outcomes to the Recipient: a positive outcome that delivered a
high-value allocation to both herself and the recipient, or a
negative outcome that delivered a high-value allocation to
herself and a low-value allocation to the Recipient. A positive
outcome for monkeys consisted of a grape for both the Actor
and the Recipient; a negative outcome consisted of a grape for
the Actor and a piece of spinach for the Recipient. A positive
outcome for children consisted of 4 small, star-shaped stickers
for both the Actor and Recipient; a negative outcome consisted
of 4 small, star-shaped stickers for the Actor and 1 small, star-
shaped sticker for the Recipient. Actors always received the
high-value reward, regardless of what they chose to distribute to
Figure 1. Testing apparatus used for monkeys. Monkey Actors pulled one of the two levers to choose an outcome to distribute to the Receiver
situated on the other side of the apparatus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087035.g001
Give What You Get
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Receivers; thus, there was no cost to generosity and no benefit
from greed–participants’ distributions to conspecifics revealed
the tendency to pay forward outcomes, divorced from potential
selfish motives present in zero-sum distribution tasks. In
addition, using the same value reward across both options for
the Actors removed any confounds related to differences in or
distractions from their own outcome.
Results
Actors’ distributions were strongly related to previously received
outcomes, for both monkeys (n = 4 participants, 22 trials, Fisher’s
exact, p= .03) and children (n= 48 children, 48 trials, Fisher’s
exact, p= .009). Monkeys paid forward negative outcomes 75% of
the time and positive outcomes 80% of the time; children paid
forward negative outcomes 72% of the time and positive outcomes
70% of the time. The rates at which positive versus negative
outcomes were paid forward did not significantly differ in monkeys
(X2(1, N=17) = .06, p= .81) or children (X2(1, N=34) = .12,
p= .73). Similarly, the rates at which children versus monkeys
paid forward positive (X2(1, N=33) = .38, p= .54) and negative
(X2(1, N= 37) = .04, p= .85) outcomes were not statistically
different across species. See Figure 3 for all results.
We also performed a series of logistic regressions in order to
confirm that the giving behavior of both children and monkeys
truly reflected a tendency to pay forward both positive and
negative behavior in kind. If this was the case, then previously
received outcomes should predict giving behavior even when
controlling for all other possible variables (e.g., identity of initial
Actor, identity of Recipient). A regression on monkey giving
behavior (positive, negative) using the predictors of initial Actor
identity, focal participant identity, final Receiver identity, and received outcome
(positive, negative) revealed that only received outcome affected giving
behavior, Wald’s X2(1) = 7.34, p,.01; all other predictors p..45. A
regression on children’s giving behavior (positive, negative) using
‘the predictors of initial Actor gender, focal participant gender, final
Receiver gender, and received outcome (positive, negative) revealed that
only received outcome affected giving behavior, Wald’s X2(1) = 7.34,
p,.01; all other predictors p..16. Taken together, these analyses
confirm that the giving behavior of both children and monkeys can
be attributed to previously received outcomes–that is, they paid
both positive and negative behavior forward in kind. See Tables
S1 and S2 for trial-by-trial data.
Figure 2. Testing apparatus used for children. Actors pulled one of the two levers to choose an outcome to distribute to the Receiver situated
on the other side of the apparatus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087035.g002
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Discussion
Our results suggest that the propagation of both positive and
negative behavior within social groups may stem from a
mechanism that is both cognitively simple and evolutionarily
old. Our finding that monkeys and 4-year-old children paid
forward positive outcomes to conspecifics is line with previous
behavioral findings in rats [32], and confirms that the act of paying
forward positive events does not require complex emotions [15],
human-specific norms [20], or sophisticated perspective-taking
abilities [21]. Our results also indicate that both populations paid
forward positive and negative outcomes, demonstrating that paying
forward behavior is not limited to prosocial interactions. Instead,
our findings suggest that paying forward behavior in monkeys and
children is best explained by a simple give-what-you-get mecha-
nism–one that may be the foundation upon which more complex
cooperative behaviors are built in adult humans.
Overall, our findings are consistent with a contingency-based
give-what-you-get strategy, a form of generalized reciprocity in
which like begets like, regardless of the specific recipient or the
valence of the outcome [23]. Giving what you get is less cognitively
complex than other forms of reciprocity, and so is a likely
explanation for group-level cooperation in non-human animals
[63,64]. Importantly, because contingency-based strategies like
give-what-you-get are not sensitive to recipient identity, individ-
uals employing them need not differentiate between paying
outcomes forward and paying outcomes back; they are simply
motivated to reciprocate outcomes in kind. As a result, this
explanation implies that the pattern of behavior of monkeys and
children in the current study may not necessarily be specific to
paying-it-forward, but rather a reflection of a motivation to
reciprocate outcomes in general. If this were the case, we would
expect similar patterns of giving whether the recipient was the
same or different than the individual from whom an allocation was
received; that is, we would expect minimal differences between
paying behavior forward and paying behavior back. However, if
the mechanism underlying our results is specific to paying-it-
forward, we would expect different patterns of giving when
individuals have the opportunity to pay outcomes back to the initial
actor. While the current data do not allow us to make this
distinction, future research could examine the extent to which
common and distinct mechanisms underlie these two related
behaviors.
In our results, monkeys and children appear to pay forward like
outcomes at equally high rates, despite evidence suggesting
predispositions toward prosociality in other contexts [39–43].
The current data do not include baseline levels of giving, but a
follow-up study comparing general rates of positive/negative
outcome distribution with rates after participants receive a
positive/negative outcome themselves would offer insight into
the relative strength of the drive to pay forward positive vs.
negative outcomes. Nonetheless, our findings show a clear pattern
of behavior in which giving in both monkeys and children is
influenced by the valence of received outcomes; these data suggest
that a ‘‘give what you get’’ strategy drives the tendency to pay
forward both positive and negative outcomes.
A second (and not mutually exclusive) possibility consistent with
our results is that pay-it-forward tendencies are driven by basic
affective processes, ones that may be precursors to the more
sophisticated emotions observed in adult humans [10]. Whereas
affect (i.e. positive and negative feelings) occur automatically
[65,66] and across species [67], gratitude is considered a
secondary emotion requiring additional cognitive resources to
interpret initial basic affective responses [15,68,69]. Capuchin
monkeys do not possess the suite of cognitive abilities associated
with explanations relying on complex emotions like gratitude, and
thus these emotions cannot drive pay forward behaviors as some
have hypothesized [15–18]. However, both children and capu-
chins possess basic affective processes that may drive paying
forward of both positive and negative outcomes. Indeed, affect has
been shown to motivate future behavior in adult humans
[10,31,70–73] as well other primate species [74–76]; further
research may determine the role of affective factors in pay-it-
forward behaviors in capuchin monkeys and children.
While the form of paying-it-forward we observed in capuchin
monkeys and young children does not require secondary emotions,
perspective-taking abilities, or uniquely human social or moral
norms, these factors are likely important in adult humans. Our
results therefore hint that the mechanism underlying pay-it-
Figure 3. Percentage of total trials in which monkeys and children paid forward positive and negative outcomes after receiving
positive and negative outcomes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087035.g003
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forward behavior in children and monkeys serves as a framework
around which more sophisticated social, emotional, and moral
decision-making systems are built in adult humans. For example,
while adult humans–like monkeys and children–surely experience
basic affective responses after experiencing a positive or negative
outcome, they may be uniquely be able to draw upon a more
sophisticated suite of cognitive abilities with which to reflect upon
their experiences and determine their future actions. Whereas
monkeys and children in our study consistently paid forward
negative outcomes despite the no-cost nature of the task, the
general tendency to pay forward negative outcomes in adults may
be overshadowed by more cognitively sophisticated processes such
as cost/benefit analyses [26] or concerns about maintaining one’s
positive reputation within the group [77–79]. Indeed, research
shows that human adults often act in strikingly self-interested ways
when cost/benefit analyses tip in their favor and the likelihood of
negative reputational repercussions is low [80–82], suggesting that
increased cognitive sophistication doesn’t necessitate increased
prosociality, but rather facilitates flexible decision-making pro-
cesses. Likewise, it is probable that paying forward generosity in
human adults is not merely due to general positive affect, but is
instead the result of further cost/benefit analyses, secondary
emotions like gratitude [15], adherence to cultural or religious
norms [19], and/or means to attain the warm glow that comes as
the result of being the cause of another’s good fortune [80]. In the
end, though, all of these more cognitively complex factors may
merely be building on–or modifying–the simple strategies evident
in the behavior of organisms such as capuchin monkeys and
human children.
Our results indicate that the propagation of prosocial behavior
within groups is not rooted in prosocial motives alone, but instead
emerges via a simple mechanism, shared across phylogeny and
ontogeny, that encourages paying forward both positive and
negative behaviors in kind. Our results suggest that even the most
heartwarming acts of paying forward generosity likely have their
roots in a simple mechanism that is not limited to prosocial
tendencies. While emotions like gratitude and uniquely human
norms likely play a role in the extraordinary cases of paying
forward generosity that make newspaper headlines, our data
suggest paying-it-forward may propagate and persist within social
groups, even in the absence of these factors. Although a fascination
with the propagation of kindness–and a tendency to explain these
behaviors in moralistic terms–may be uniquely human, the
mechanism underlying this behavior is likely not.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Positive/Negative outcome distribution patterns
within testing chains for monkeys. Each row represents a discrete
test session; monkeys only participated in one test session per day.
Trials in which monkeys ‘gave what they got’ are bolded. Trials in
which monkeys paid forward negative outcomes are highlighted in
blue; trials in which monkeys paid forward positive outcomes are
highlighted in yellow.
(TIF)
Table S2 Positive/Negative outcome distribution patterns
within testing chains for children. Each row represents a single
testing chain; variance in chain length is due to variance in the
number of consenting children per classroom. Trials in which
children (males =M; females = F) ‘gave what they got’ are bolded.
Trials in which children paid forward negative outcomes are
highlighted in blue; trials in which children paid forward positive
outcomes are highlighted in yellow.
(TIF)
Methods S1 Supplemental methods.
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